



An End to Too Big to Let Fail?
The Dodd–Frank Act’s Orderly Liquidation Authority 
Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV and James B. Thomson
One of the changes introduced by the sweeping new ﬁ  nancial market legislation of the Dodd–Frank Act is the provision 
of a formal process for liquidating large ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms—something that would have been useful in 2008, when troubles 
at Lehman Brothers, AIG, and Merrill Lynch threatened to damage the entire U.S. ﬁ  nancial system. While it may not be 
the end of the too-big-to-fail problem, the orderly liquidation authority is an important new tool in the regulatory toolkit. 
It will enable regulators to safely close and wind up the affairs of those distressed ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms whose failure could   
destabilize the ﬁ  nancial system. 
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“…the U.S. government lacked any workable means to address 
the potential disorderly failure of a large, systemically important 
ﬁ  rm in a way that protected the economy and taxpayers from severe 
collateral damage.”
—Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, April 2007
Many observers point to the summer of 2007 as the start-
ing date for the ﬁ  nancial crisis that would bring down most 
of the U.S. investment banking industry, force the U.S. 
Treasury to take Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into con-
servatorship, and prompt the federal government to infuse 
capital into the largest banks and nonbank ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms in 
the country. If the summer of 2007 marked the beginning of 
the crisis, then Lehman Brothers ﬁ  ling for protection from 
its creditors under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code in 
September 2008 marked the end of the beginning. Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy petition, coupled with the announce-
ment of a taxpayer rescue of AIG and the deathbed acquisi-
tion of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America, sent shockwaves 
through the ﬁ  nancial system. The Federal Reserve and the 
U.S. Treasury moved quickly to contain the damage.
In some sense it does not matter whether the shock to the 
ﬁ  nancial system was due to the failure of Lehman Broth-
ers or to uncertainty about whether the government would 
support large, distressed ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms, often referred 
to as the too-big-to-fail problem. Whatever its cause, the 
market turbulence in the days immediately after Lehman’s 
failure conﬁ  rmed the fears of policymakers that bank-
ruptcy was unlikely to produce an orderly resolution of a 
large nonbank ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rm, at least not during a period 
of ﬁ  nancial market stress. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that Title II of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act adds orderly resolution powers 
to the supervisory toolkit.
Some observers have hailed Title II of Dodd–Frank as the 
end of the too-big-to-fail problem as we know it. A number 
of reports have suggested that Title II replaces bankruptcy 
as the default method for resolving the insolvency of large 
nonbank ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms, especially those identiﬁ  ed as 
systemically important. However, these are both miscon-
ceptions about the orderly liquidation authority in Dodd–
Frank. In this Economic Commentary we provide an overview 
of Title II of the Dodd–Frank Act and clarify its implica-
tions for ﬁ  nancial market supervisory policy going forward.
Financial Institution Failures Are Different
The insolvency of most ﬁ  rms is handled through the 
judicial process of bankruptcy. Depending on the type of 
bankruptcy petition ﬁ  led—Chapter 11 (reorganization) or 
Chapter 7 (liquidation)—the bankruptcy process can involve 
negotiations between creditor committees and between 
creditor committees and the management of the ﬁ  rm. Deci-
sions of the bankruptcy court are subject to judicial review 
and can be appealed in federal court.Through much of its history, the United States has treated 
the failures of banking companies differently than the 
failures of other businesses. During the late 1800s, 50 years 
before the Federal Reserve was founded, national banks that 
were either closed forcibly or were voluntarily shuttering 
their operations went through an administrative receivership 
process managed by the Ofﬁ  ce of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, a subagency of the U.S. Treasury.
Two factors had encouraged the creation of a bank-speciﬁ  c 
resolution regime at the time. First, it was important to the 
goal of a uniform currency. Banking legislation of the day 
sought to provide a uniform national currency by ensuring 
that the bank notes issued by national banks could be used 
as widely as possible. A critical component of such an ap-
proach was a process of seamlessly redeeming and retiring 
the notes of failed banks. Second, there were no provisions 
for bankruptcy in the federal code at the time. In fact, a per-
manent federal bankruptcy code would not be enacted until 
nearly the end of the nineteenth century.
Years later, on the heels of massive bank failures, the Bank-
ing Act of 1933 established a system of federal deposit 
guarantees and created a new federal entity, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The FDIC would 
be charged with insuring the accounts of depositors at banks 
and would (for national banks and most state-chartered 
banks) operate and administer the receivership of failed 
banks (this responsibility was expanded in the late 1980s to 
include all FDIC-insured depository institutions).
The recent ﬁ  nancial crisis gave legislators a number of 
new challenges to deal with. One was what to do with the 
so-called shadow banking system. The shadow, or parallel, 
banking system refers to nondepository ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms that 
resemble banks in terms of their activities and their reliance 
on short-term funding, but which are not banks since they 
don’t fund themselves with deposits. The similarity of these 
large nondepository ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms to traditional banks has 
led some to question whether bank-like resolution regimes 
should be extended to include them. Calls for a “shadow 
solvency resolution” regime for systemically important non-
depository companies reached a crescendo during the ﬁ  nan-
cial crisis, as ﬁ  nancial system supervisors worked feverishly 
to prevent the disorderly failure of a number of these ﬁ  rms 
and to contain the negative spillovers associated with the 
reorganization of Lehman Brothers. Title II of the Dodd–
Frank Act established just such a resolution authority.
Orderly Liquidation Authority: How It Works
As the ﬁ  nancial reform legislation marched forward in both 
houses of Congress, one of the most debated parts of 
the legislation was Title II. The debated issues ranged from 
who would operate the receivership function to which ﬁ  rms 
or types of ﬁ  rms would be subject to the authority, and 
how it would be funded. Ultimately, Congress established 
a process for implementing the authority and gave the 
responsibility for operating the receivership to the FDIC. In 
addition, Congress decided that Title II resolutions would 
not be funded by means of an ex ante resolution fund.
Congress decided that ﬁ  rms subject to Title II resolution 
would be determined through a multistep process. First, 
it must be determined whether a company is a “covered 
ﬁ  nancial company” under the Dodd–Frank Act. Covered 
ﬁ  nancial companies include all ﬁ  rms that derive 85 percent 
of their revenues from activities that are ﬁ  nancial in nature, 
as well as any ﬁ  nancial company designated as systemically 
important by the Financial Stability Oversight Council. The 
Act requires the FDIC to deﬁ  ne what makes an activity 
ﬁ  nancial in nature, though the Act speciﬁ  es that revenues 
derived from the ownership or control of depository institu-
tions be included as part of the deﬁ  nition. Expressly exclud-
ed from the deﬁ  nition of a covered ﬁ  nancial company are all 
depository institutions, government sponsored enterprises, 
and any government entity.
Once it is determined that a ﬁ  rm is a covered ﬁ  nancial 
company, the next step in subjecting it to a Title II resolu-
tion involves the agreement of oversight agencies to pro-
ceed. Namely, two-thirds of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, along with two-thirds of either the 
FDIC Board, the SEC (for securities broker-dealers), or the 
Federal Insurance Ofﬁ  ce (for insurance companies), must 
write a recommendation detailing why the authority should 
be used. Upon receiving the written recommendation, the 
Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the President, 
must decide whether four conditions are met: The ﬁ  rm 
must be either in default or in danger of default; its failure 
under the Bankruptcy Code would have serious ﬁ  nancial 
stability effects; a Title II resolution would avoid or mitigate 
these effects; and there is no viable private sector alternative 
to the use of the resolution authority.
 The Act provides for a limited judicial review of the clas-
siﬁ  cation of the ﬁ  rm as a covered ﬁ  nancial institution that is 
in default or in danger of default. Judicial review utilizes an 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard—typical when review-
ing decisions of administrative agencies—which essentially 
prevents the judiciary from overruling those determinations 
unless there was no reasonable basis for them.The FDIC must be named receiver of any ﬁ  rm placed into 
a Title II receivership. Its powers under the orderly liquida-
tion authority mirror those it already has for depository 
institution receiverships, including the equivalent of bridge 
bank authority (the ability to create and operate a tempo-
rary ﬁ  rm into which some or all of the assets and liabilities 
of the failed ﬁ  rm can be passed) and the limited judicial re-
view of its actions. Creditor protections in orderly resolution 
are limited to the requirement that unsecured creditors can 
receive no less in a Title II resolution than they would have 
received under a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.
Despite this requirement, the FDIC has two powers under 
its resolution authority that vary in important ways from 
bankruptcy law. First, it is allowed to treat unsecured credi-
tors of the same class differently if doing so is consistent 
with an orderly resolution of the ﬁ  rm. Second, for qualiﬁ  ed 
ﬁ  nancial contracts (QFCs)—basically, derivative contracts 
and repurchase agreements (repos)—the FDIC gets a one-
day automatic stay, meaning counterparties on the QFCs 
must wait before taking the collateral backing their claim. 
Note that most QFCs are currently exempt from automatic 
stay provisions in bankruptcy. The FDIC can then consider 
all the claims, QFCs, and property securing the QFCs that 
are associated with a single counterparty and pass them to 
another company (including its bridge institution) or keep 
them in the failed institution. The passing of a QFC to 
another institution would not constitute a default under the 
orderly resolution authority of the Dodd–Frank Act.
Unlike traditional FDIC resolution, there is no ex ante reso-
lution fund the FDIC can draw on to fund a Title II resolu-
tion. Initially, the receivership can be funded by borrowing 
from the U.S. Treasury, but the loan must be repaid within 
60 months. At the end of the day, the cost of the resolution 
is to be funded from the sale of unencumbered receiver-
ship assets and through assessments on other large ﬁ  nancial 
institutions. To the extent that a creditor receives preferential 
treatment during the receivership (such as a higher payout 
on their claim than similarly situated creditors, or even more 
senior creditors), the FDIC can assess them for an amount 
up to what they received in excess of similar creditors of the 
failed company.
The Dodd–Frank Act has a number of provisions aimed 
speciﬁ  cally at the management of any ﬁ  rm placed into the 
orderly liquidation process. It states at the outset that the 
purpose of the orderly liquidation is, in part, to ensure that 
the management responsible for the condition of a liquidat-
ed company is not retained and personally bears losses con-
sistent with their responsibility. As such, an action required 
of the FDIC once it is acting as a receiver is removing the 
ﬁ  rm’s management and any members of the ﬁ  rm’s board of 
directors who are determined by the FDIC to be responsible 
for the condition of the company. The Act does not provide 
guidance on the determination of responsibility.
Furthermore, the FDIC may pursue legal action against 
directors and ofﬁ  cers for anything from gross negligence—
essentially behavior that falls far short of what the ordi-
nary reasonable person would have done in similar circum-
stances—to intentional misconduct. It may also recoup com-
pensation paid in the past two years to senior executives and 
directors who are “substantially responsible” for the failed 
condition of a liquidated ﬁ  rm. Finally, the Federal Reserve’s 
Board of Governors and the FDIC are given the power to 
prohibit senior executives or directors from participating in 
a ﬁ  nancial company’s affairs when the executive or director 
violates written orders or agreements, breaches his or her 
ﬁ  duciary duty to the corporation, or engages in any unsafe 
or unsound practice in connection with the company.
Orderly Liquidation Authority Going Forward
The orderly liquidation authority is meant to be an excep-
tional power and not the default procedure for winding up 
the affairs of large distressed nondepository ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms. 
The implicit expectation in the Dodd–Frank Act is that 
the majority of troubled nondepository ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms will 
continue to be resolved in bankruptcy. Yet it recognizes 
that some nondepository ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rm failures are differ-
ent from others because of their potential to signiﬁ  cantly 
destabilize the ﬁ  nancial system. Thus, the Act provides an 
important new tool in the regulatory toolkit that allows 
ﬁ  nancial system supervisors to close and resolve such ﬁ  rms 
appropriately.
With the availability of the liquidation authority, regulators 
may be able to improve the “time-consistency” of regula-
tors’ responses to troubled and failing ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms. In the 
past, the only way to prevent the instability that might result 
from a large ﬁ  rm being resolved through bankruptcy was 
to keep it aﬂ  oat or smooth its resolution with an infusion of 
funds. The new resolution authority creates a viable option 
to providing funds to failing ﬁ  rms and should send mar-
kets a clear signal of how such ﬁ  rms will be resolved. The 
provision of such authority by Congress does not, itself, end 
too-big-to-fail. Consistent and appropriate use of the author-
ity, however, is an important step toward addressing the 
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